Barrier Based Risk Management Event – including Hearts and Minds and TRIPOD workshops

July 27, 2012

The ‘Barrier Based Risk Management Network Event’ will be held in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 24 and 25 September.

Expanding on the TRIPOD User Day events held over the last several years, this 2-day conference will include a mixture of plenary sessions and break-out workshops exploring barrier based risk management techniques and issues, including Hearts and Minds, TRIPOD Beta, the use of qualitative risk assessment, safety culture improvement, and incident analysis.

The event features speakers at the forefront of academic risk management research, including Prof. Ira Helsloot or Radboud University Nijmegen, Dr. Frank Guldenmund of Delft University of Technology, Prof. Graham Braithwaite of Cranfield University, and Dr. Jop Groeneweg of the University of Leiden.

The Energy Institute will also be hosting a workshop session on the use of the Hearts and Minds toolkit, facilitated by Prof. Dianne Parker, one of the toolkit’s original developers.

Registration for this event costs €250.  To find out more please visit the event website.

Thinking fast and slow – understanding how decisions are made

July 16, 2012

Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, author of a number of seminal studies in behavioural psychology, behavioural economics, and happiness studies, has authored his first book – Thinking, Fast and Slow, published by Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2011 describing how the brain makes decisions.

Graham Reeves, Chairman of the EI Human and Organisational Factors Committee writes:

“This is an entertaining and easy to read book, in which the author provides the reader with his current understanding of judgment and decision making.

The two different ways by which the brain forms thoughts are described:

  • System 1:  Where thought is fast, automatic, frequent, emotional, stereotypic, and subconscious
  • System 2:  Where thought is slow, effortful, infrequent, logical, calculating, and conscious

The largely unconscious System 1 makes intuitive snap judgments based on emotion, memory, and hard-wired rules of thumb.  The painfully conscious System 2 on the other hand slowly checks the facts and does the sums.  However, it is lazy, easily distracted and usually defers to System 1.

Loss aversion, anchoring, substitution, framing, choice, rationality and optimism are all explained and help the reader to understand just why we make the decisions we do.

Kahneman provides practical insight as to how choices are made in our everyday lives and on how we can use different techniques to guard against the mental hiccups that get us into trouble.”

Could this be a useful read for those working in the energy sector (probably by more advanced users), particularly in informing emergency response and control room operations?  For example, if the planning of emergency response is based on ‘System 2’ thinking, during its implementation in rapidly changing situations will the plan hold up if people revert to ‘System 1’ thinking?

OGP publishes 2011 safety performance indicators

July 4, 2012

The Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) has published safety performance indicators for 2011.  Consisting of data collected from OGP members, the report provides statistical analysis on injury and fatality rates by reporting category, activity, country, etc.

25% of fatalities were the result of being caught in, under or between machinery/equipment, whilst 18% of fatalities were the result of being struck by an object.  The three largest areas of activities associated with fatalities were land transport (23%), construction, commission and decommissioning (17%) and maintenance, inspection and testing (17%).  By contrast, the two activities most associated with lost time injuries were drilling, workover and well services (22%) and production operations (16%).

Of note, 80% of fatalities in 2011 are covered by the OGP life-saving rules, and the report suggests that many fatalities may have been avoided with the adoption of the life-saving rule system.

The report also analyses the causal factors associated with many of the fatalities and ‘high-potential’ events (events with the potential to cause fatalities) recorded, identifying a number of management failures, including inadequate supervision, hazard identification and training/competence.